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RANGKA KERJA BERSEPADU UNTUK PENGURUSAN DIEDARKAN 
SELAMAT TAHUN DIULANG IPV6 ALAMAT PENGESANAN 
 
ABSTRAK 
Alamat  bernegara auto-konfigurasi adalah ciri utama protokol IPv6, yang 
membolehkan tuan rumah untuk mengkonfigurasi alamat IP secara automatik tanpa 
perlu apa-apa perkhidmatan tambahan seperti; DHCPv6. Walau bagaimanapun, untuk 
berkomunikasi dalam rangkaian setiap tuan rumah mesti mempunyai alamat IP yang 
unik. Untuk tujuan itu, alamat proses pengesanan pendua digunakan untuk 
memastikan bahawa alamat IP yang dihasilkan sendiri adalah unik dalam rangkaian. 
Dalam usaha untuk melaksanakan proses DAD, tuan rumah IPv6 menggunakan jiran 
permintaan  dan  jiran  iklan  mesej  yang  berkomunikasi  antara  satu  sama  lain  dalam 
rangkaian diedarkan IPv6. Walau bagaimanapun, reka bentuk mekanisme NDP telah 
menanggung  kelemahan  keselamatan  dan  terdedah  kepada  spoofing,  menyebabkan 
menjadi  terdedah  kepada  serangan  DoS.  Penyelidikan  telah  menunjukkan  bahawa 
proses DAD terdedah kepada penafian serangan perkhidmatan, yang boleh 
menghalang tuan rumah IPv6(s) daripada mendapatkan alamat IP yang unik. Dalam 
usaha  untuk  menangani  isu  ini,  beberapa  mekanisme  telah  dicadangkan  seperti; 
Hantar, Trust-ND, SSAS, Pull Model, dan DAD-h. Walau bagaimanapun, disebabkan 
oleh reka bentuk mereka, mekanisme ini telah secara tidak langsung memperkenalkan 
kelemahan spoofing yang boleh menyebabkan serangan DoS mengenai proses DAD. 
Oleh  itu,  tesis  ini  memberi  satu  rangka  kerja  bersepadu  yang  dipanggil  "Secure-
Duplicate  Alamat  Pengesanan  (Secure-DAD)", untuk  menjamin  mesej  NS/NA  dari 
mana-mana exploitations yang boleh menyebabkan serangan DoS semasa proses DAD 
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dalam IPv6 rangkaian diedarkan. Secure-DAD, memperkenalkan pilihan NDP baru 
yang  dipanggil  "Secure-tag"  untuk  menjamin  NS/NA  mesej  pertukaran  antara  tuan 
rumah  semasa  proses  DAD.  IPv6-ujian  telah  persediaan  bagi  menjalankan  uji  kaji, 
untuk mengesahkan prestasi Secure-DAD berbanding DAD standard dan mekanisme 
Trust-ND. Secure-DAD dinilai dari segi ringan, kerahsiaan, integriti dan ketersediaan. 
Analisis keputusan menunjukkan bahawa Secure-DAD ini lebih baik dengan 
peningkatan  dari  segi  pengurangan  masa  pemprosesan  45.1%  berbanding  dengan 
Trust-ND.Selain itu, analisis keselamatan menunjukkan bahawa Secure-DAD boleh 
memastikan  mesej  kerahsiaan,  integriti  dan  ketersediaan  daripada  serangan  DoS 
semasa pengesahan alamat dalam proses IPv6 DAD. Oleh itu, dari proses penilaian, ia 
telah terbukti  bahawa  Secure-DAD  boleh digunakan untuk proses DAD  dalam 
rangkaian diedarkan IPv6. 
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INTEGRATED FRAMEWORK FOR SECURE DISTRIBUTED 
MANAGEMENT OF DUPLICATED IPv6 ADDRESS DETECTION  
 
ABSTRACT 
Stateless  address  auto-configuration  is  the  primary  feature  of  IPv6  protocol, 
which allows hosts to configure IP addresses automatically without the need of any 
additional  services  such  as;  DHCPv6.  Nevertheless,  to  communicate  in  a  network 
every host must have a unique IP address. For that purpose, duplicate address detection 
process is used to ensure that self-generated IP address is unique in a network. In order 
to perform DAD process, IPv6 hosts use neighbor solicitation and neighbor 
advertisement messages to communicate with each other in IPv6 distributed network. 
However, the  design of NDP mechanism has incurred security flaws and are 
vulnerable to spoofing, causing to be prone to DoS attacks. Research has shown that 
DAD process is vulnerable to denial of service attacks, which can deprive IPv6 host(s) 
from obtaining a unique IP address. In order to address this issue, several mechanisms 
have  been  proposed  such  as;  SeND,  Trust-ND,  SSAS,  Pull  Model,  and  DAD-h. 
However, due to their design, these mechanisms have indirectly introduced spoofing 
vulnerabilities  which  can  cause  DoS  attacks  on  DAD  process.  Hence,  this  thesis 
presents an integrated framework called “Secure-Duplicate Address Detection 
(Secure-DAD)”, to secure NS/NA messages from any exploitations which can induce 
DoS attacks during DAD process in IPv6 distributed network. Secure-DAD, 
introduces a new  NDP  Option  called  “Secure-tag”  to  secure  NS/NA  messages 
exchange  between  the  hosts  during  DAD  process.  IPv6  test-bed  has  been  setup  to 
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conduct the experiments, to verify the performance of Secure-DAD compared with 
standard  DAD,  and  Trust-ND  mechanism.  Secure-DAD  was  evaluated  in  terms of 
lightweight, confidentiality, integrity, and availability. Analysis of the results showed 
that Secure-DAD is more promising with improvement in terms of processing time 
reduction of 45.1% compared to Trust-ND. Moreover, security analysis showed that 
Secure-DAD  can  ensure  message  confidentiality,  integrity,  and  availability  against 
DoS  attacks  during  address  verification  in  IPv6  DAD  process.  Hence,  from  the 
evaluation process, it has been proven that Secure-DAD is applicable for DAD process 
in IPv6 distributed network. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 Overview 
From  the days  of  ARPANET  (Leiner  et  al., 2009),  with  slightly  over two  hundred 
connected hosts involving five organizations to a massive global, always-on network 
connecting hosts in the billions. According to the recent report, Internet has become as 
important  as  the  need  for  electricity  and  water (Leusse,  2015). The  legacy  Internet 
protocol (Postel, 1981) i.e. Internet protocol version 4 (IPv4) has served its purpose 
from over the years (Ali, 2012). However, the advancement of Internet technologies 
with ever-expanding Internet users and a growing number of IP-enabled devices had 
raised various issues about its limited features set such as: IP address Pool, robustness 
as well as its scalability (Ali, 2012; Batiha et al., 2011).  
In  order  to  overcome  these  challenges,  the  Internet  Engineering  Task  Force 
(IETF) which is the governing body of Internet community has designed a new version 
of Internet protocol, i.e. Internet protocol version 6 (IPv6) as defined in RFC 2460 
(Deering,  1998).  IPv6,  in  addition  to  providing  a  much  larger  address  space,  new 
features were introduced such as; simpler header format, extension header, mobility 
functions, as well as address auto-configuration (Davies, 2012; Colitti et al., 2010).  
Nevertheless, as with any new technology, IPv6 also suffers from security 
vulnerabilities  and  issues  such  as;  reconnaissance  attacks,  header fragmentation 
attacks, risks of tunnels and potential holes in dual stacks approaches, and denial of 
service (DoS) attacks which can be carried out by misusing the ICMPv6 messages 
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types (Elejla et al., 2016; Saad, et al. 2013). Internet Control Message Protocol version 
6 (ICMPv6) is the implementation of the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP) 
for Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6). ICMP messages are being used to perform error 
reporting and diagnostic functions. ICMPv6 is an integral part of IPv6 Protocol and is 
defined in RFC 4443 (Conta and Gupta, 2006). ICMPv6 messages have been discussed 
in details in Chapter Two in Section 2.2.2. Figure 1.1 depicts the typical IPv6 attack 
types. 
 
Figure 1.1:Typical IPv6 Attack Types. 
 
1.1.1 IPv6 Features and Related Security Issues 
One of the main features of IPv6 protocol, other than large address pool, is the address 
auto-configuration as defined in RFC 2462 (Thomson, 1998). This feature allows host 
joining  a  network  to  seamlessly  obtain  network  configuration  and  automatically 
configure itself without the need for service i.e. Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol 
(DHCPv6).  DHCP  is  a  communications protocol which  is  based  on  client/server 
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model  that  allows  network  administrators  to  centrally  manage  and  automate  the 
network  configuration of  devices  attaching  to  an  Internet  Protocol  (IP)  network  as 
defined in RFC 3315 (Droms, 2003). Whereas, address auto-configuration which is 
meant for distributed networks i.e. peer-to-peer based allows IPv6 hosts to manage 
addresses configuration automatically in IPv6 network. Thus, stateless auto-
configuration simplifies addressing assignment among hosts in IPv6 network as hosts 
can generate addresses without need for DHCPv6 services i.e. stateful auto-
configuration.  The  centralized  and  distributed  address  management  will  be  further 
elaborated in Chapter Two.  
Stateless address auto-configuration has eased IP addressing assignment. 
Nevertheless, due  to the  way  it  was  designed it  raises  security  consequences  if  not 
configured properly (AlSa’deh et al., 2012; Groat et al., 2010; Narten et al., 2007). 
Therefore, in general comparison, IPv6 protocol offers better features and options than 
IPv4 protocol ( Saad, et al. 2013; Ali 2012; Batiha et al., 2011; Durdaugi and Buldu, 
2010). However, research have shown that there are certain areas in IPv6 protocol i.e. 
stateless  address  auto-configuration  which  is  vulnerable  to  denial  of  service  (DoS) 
attacks that prevents IPv6 host(s) to configure itself to join the network (Elejla et al., 
2016; Barbhuiya et al., 2011; Caicedo et al., 2009; Yang et al., 2007; Garber, 2000). 
DoS attack and its impact on IPv6 network has been discussed in Section 1.1.3.  
1.1.2 Denial of Service Attacks 
Denial of Service (DoS) attack is one of the most significant threats in both IPv4 and 
IPv6 networks (Raghavan and Dawson, 2011). Furthermore, the recent study (Elejla 
et al., 2016) has shown that DoS attacks are the major security threats to IPv6 network.  
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According  to  this  study,  68%  of  the  IPv6  vulnerablities  comes  under  DoS  attacks 
category. These attacks consume the computational resources of the target host(s) and 
the bandwidth of the network. This leads to the service provided by the target host 
become  unavailable  to  its  intended  users.  A  DoS  attack  generated  by  utilizing  the 
vulnerabilities in the network protocols, affects the performance of the target host as 
well as the other hosts sharing the same network. A targeted host is unable to process 
such large amount of network traffic and becomes unavailable or out of service. 
Moreover, when this attack is carried out on a large scale is known as Distributed 
Denial  of  Service  (DDoS)  attacks  (Specht  and  Lee,  2004).  A  distributed  denial  of 
service (DDoS) attack only differs with DoS attack from the method. DoS attack is 
made from a singular system or network while DDoS attack is organized to happen 
simultaneously  from a large number of systems or networks (Prudente et al., 2012; 
Peng, et al., 2007).  
1.1.3 Denial of Service Attacks in IPv6 Network 
DoS attacks are typically carried out at application and network layers (Li et al., 2011). 
In IPv6 network such attacks can further be carried out at the link local level due to 
the design of Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) (Arkko et al., 2005). NDP is one of 
the main protocol in the IPv6 Internet protocol suite. It operates in the link layer of the 
Internet  model  as  specified  in  RFC  1122  (Braden,  1989),  and  is  responsible  for 
communication  between  the  hosts  in  IPv6  link  local  network.  Neighbor  Discovery 
Protocol has been further discussed in Section 1.1.5. Therefore, based on the attack 
level,  the  DoS  attacks  in  IPv6  network  can  broadly  be  classified  into  two  main 
categories i.e. application level and network level. Further, network level DoS attacks 
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can be sub-divided into Gateway (router) and link local level respectively as illustrated 
in Figure 1.2. 
 
Figure 1.2: Taxonomy of Denial of Service Attacks in IPv6 Network. 
 
During  address  auto-configuration  in  IPv6  link  local  communication  (LLC), 
Internet Control Message Protocol version 6 (ICMPv6) messages are used by the hosts 
to communicate with neighboring hosts within a local link (Conta and Gupta, 2006). 
However, studies (Elejla et al., 2016; Saad et al.  2013; Caicedo et al. 2009; Nikander 
et  al.  2004)  have  shown  that  the  ICMPv6  messages  are  vulnerable  to  DoS  attacks 
during  duplicate  address  detection  (DAD)  process.  Duplicate  Address  Detection 
(DAD) process is being performed by IPv6 hosts to avoid IP address conflict in the 
network  (Krishnan  and  Daley,  2010;  Thomson,  1998),  while  host(s)  attempts  to 
configure  its  self-generated  interface  identifier  in  the  network (IID) (Carpenter  and 
Jiang,  2014).  
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Therefore,  any attacker  host  can take  advantage  of  it  and  can  fabricate  these 
ICMPv6 messages. Later, attacker can exploit these modified messages to generate 
DoS attacks in a number of ways such as; ICMPv6 messages spoofing, Man-in-the-
Middle form or simply sending  excessive number of bogus ICMPv6 messages to the 
target host on the same link. Here, DoS attack refers to the absence of the service i.e. 
configuring  IP  addresses  rather  than  service  unavailability  due  to  flooding  attack. 
Thus,  in  this  manner,  attacker  can  disrupt  the  IPv6  hosts  to  obtain  their  interface 
identifiers (IIDs) (Elejla et al., 2016; Rafiee and Meinel, 2013). IPv6 DAD process 
and its related issue has been described in detail in Section 1.1.6. 
1.1.4 Address Configuration 
In IPv6, stateless address auto-configuration (SLAAC) mechanism allows host(s) to 
derive IP address automatically as the interface identifier (ID) portion of a link layer 
address is generated directly from the device-specific MAC i.e. media access 
control address due to its design, unlike in IPv4 protocol as mentioned in RFC 4291 
(Hinden  and  Deering,  2006).  Therefore,  there  is  no  need  of  Address  Resolution 
Protocol  (Plummer,  1982)  in  IPv6  protocol.  This  new  protocol  called  Neighbor 
Discovery Protocol replaced ARP functionality in IPv6 SLAAC mechanism. SLAAC 
mechanism has been discussed in detail in Chapter Two in Section 2.2.  
1.1.5 Neighbor Discovery Protocol  
Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) was defined in RFC 4861 (Narten et al. 2007). 
From the name itself i.e. neighbor discovery, this protocol by using ICMPv6 messages 
allows  IPv6  hosts  to  discovery  the  neighboring  hosts  in  IPv6  link  local  network. 
Moreover, it provides additional functionalities such as; address resolution, neighbor 
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unreachability detection, router discovery, redirect method for access routers to inform 
IPv6  hosts  the  most  appropriate  route  available  in  the  network.  Also,  to  perform 
duplicate  address  detection  process  in  IPv6  link  local  network,  which  has  been 
discussed in detail in Section 1.1.6. Figure 1.3 depicts the neighbor discovery process 
in IPv6 link local network. 
 
Figure 1.3: Neighbor Discovery Process in IPv6 Network. 
 (Adapted from (Arkko et al., 2002)) 
 
In  IPv6  link  local  communication,  NDP  uses  five  types  of  Internet  Control 
ICMPv6 messages also known as neighbor discovery protocol messages to perform 
these operations are as follows:  
1. Router Solicitation (RS) message type 133, is used by IPv6 hosts to discover the 
presence of an access router(s) in IPv6 link local network.  
2.  Router Advertisement (RA) message type 134, is used by router(s) in response to 
the hosts RS message or used to periodically advertises the RA messages. 
3.  Neighbor Solicitation (NS) message type 135, is used by the IPv6 hosts to perform 
the operations like address resolution, host unreachability detection and to perform 
duplicate address detection process in IPv6 link local network.  
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4. Neighbor Advertisement (NA) message type 136, is used by the IPv6 hosts to reply 
back to the NS message queries in IPv6 link local networks.  
5. Redirect message type 137, is used by the access routers to advertise better route 
to the destination for hosts in IPv6 Link local network.  
1.1.6 Duplicate Address Detection Process and its Security Issues 
Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) process ensures that all configured addresses by 
IPv6 hosts are likely to be unique on a same link local network. Hence, every IPv6 
host(s) has to perform DAD process before assigning the addresses to an interface ( 
Yao et al., 2010; Moore et al., 2006). Although it can be argued that IP conflict  is 
extremely remote due to the immensity of the address space, this will not be the case 
in the coming years due to growth in mobile device and newly emerging technologies 
such as; Internet of Things (IoT) and Cloud computing (Botta et al., 2016, Li et al., 
2015).  
Therefore, when a new host joins the link local network or any existing host on 
the same link wants to configure a new IP address, at first IPv6 host(s) has to ensure 
that  no  neighboring  host  on  the  same  link  is  using  this  self-generated  IP  address. 
Therefore, DAD process is being performed to verify the uniqueness of self-generated 
IP addresses among IPv6 hosts on a same network (Yao et al., 2010; Moore et al., 
2006). IPv6 DAD process has been illustrated in Chapter Two in Section 2.3.  
IPv6  hosts  use  neighbor  solicitation  (NS)  and  neighbor  advertisements  (NA) 
messages  to  perform  DAD  process  in  IPv6  network  as  aforementioned  in  Section 
1.1.5. For unique address verification purpose, DAD mechanism assumes that all the 
neighboring hosts are reliable in IPv6 network. Therefore, whatever the responses a 
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host receives via NS/NA messages from the existing hosts during address verification 
process it acts accordingly regardless of being valid or invalid message (Yao et al., 
2010; Moore et al., 2006).  
However, if the NS message is replied by a malicious host via fake NA messages 
by claiming the self-generated IP address is already obtained. This will prevent IPv6 
hosts to configure their unique IP addresses. As a result, IPv6 host(s) will be unable to 
communicate in IPv6 distributed network. This type of attack is known as DoS-on-
DAD  attack,  which  deprives host(s)  from  address  configuration  in  IPv6  distributed 
network. Studies (Elejla et al., 2016; Rafiee and Meinel, 2013; Gont 2012; Yang et al., 
2007) have shown that the IPv6 DAD process is vulnerable to DoS attacks. DoS-on-
DAD attack has been explained in detail in Chapter Two in Section 2.3.2.  
1.2 Research Problem   
Duplicate address detection process is an essential operation in address auto-
configuration  mechanism  (Yao  et  al.,  2010;  Moore  et  al.,  2006),  i.e.  in  SLAAC 
mechanism  to  verify  the  uniqueness  of  self-generated  IP  address  in  IPv6  network. 
However, studies (Elejla et al., 2016; Rafiee and Meinel, 2013; AlSa'deh et al., 2012; 
Yang et al., 2007) have also shown that the standard DAD process is vulnerable to 
DoS attacks during address verification process while host(s) attempts address auto-
configuration.  Hence,  from  the  studies  it  has  been  found  that  IPv6  host(s)  can  be 
deprived from obtaining a unique IP address, which can disrupt the host’s link local 
communication (Elejla et al., 2016; Moore et al., 2006; Yao et al., 2010). In order to 
address  this  issue,  some  of  the  security  mechanisms  have  been  proposed  such  as; 
SeND, Pull Model, SSAS, Trust-ND, and DAD-h mechanisms.  
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SeND mechanism was suggested to solve the security concerns of DAD process 
in IPv6 network (Arkko et al., 2005). However, this mechanism is not trivial due to its 
heavy computation and complexity issues which can induce DoS attack during DAD 
process due to its designed mechanism (Praptodiyono et al., 2015; Rafiee et al., 2013). 
In order to address this issue, Simple Secure Addressing Scheme (SSAS) was proposed 
(Rafiee  et  al.,  2013).  Although,  this  mechanism  to  some  extent  has  addressed  the 
complexity  issue  by  introducing  a  new  addressing  scheme  compared  to  the  SeND 
mechanism. Nevertheless, SSAS mechanism still requires significant amount of time 
to process the neighbor discovery messages i.e. NS/NA which can be exploited by a 
malicious host to cause DoS attack on DAD process (Praptodiyono et al., 2015).  
Similarly, alternative mechanisms for IPv6 DAD process was proposed known 
as Pull Model (Yao et al., 2010) which uses the pull concept (Duan et al., 2005). The 
idea behind it was instead of sending the generated target address to existing hosts for 
verification; rather request i.e. Pull all the existing  hosts obtained IP addresses and 
then  compute  the  hash  value  and  perform  the  duplicate  address  verification  by 
computing  the  hash  (Yao  et  al.,  2010).  Nevertheless,  this  mechanism  was  found 
vulnerable  to  brute  force  attack  due  to  its  designed  mechanism  (Apostol,  2012; 
Knudsen at al., 2011). Therefore, the proposed idea was not implemented. 
In the recent past, Trust-ND mechanism has been proposed that claims to be the 
lightweight mechanism compared to SeND and SSAS schemes (Praptodiyono et al., 
2015). Trust-ND uses the concept of trust as defined in RFC 3756 (Nikander et al., 
2004). Nevertheless, the issue with Trust-ND mechanism is that it is built on SHA-1 
hashing algorithm (Polk et al., 2011; Wang et al., 2005) which is vulnerable to hash 
collision attacks (Bhargavan et al., 2016; Andreeva et al., 2015; Polk et al., 2011). 
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Thus, due to its designed mechanism, any malicious host can compromise Trust-ND 
to induce DoS attack during DAD process in IPv6 distributed network. 
Recently, DAD-h mechanism was proposed (Song and Ji, 2016), this mechanism 
was designed based on MD5 hash algorithm. According to Song and Ji, (2016), DAD-
h mechanism hides the hosts self-generated i.e. target address during address 
verification process and ensures only those hosts participate in DAD process that are 
enabled with DAD-h  mechanism.  However, research  have shown  that  MD5  is 
vulnerable to hash collision attacks (Bhargavan et al., 2016; Andreeva et al., 2015; 
Polk et al., 2011). Thus, any malicious host can compromise the DAD-h to cause DoS 
attack during DAD process in IPv6 distributed network.   
Although  some  of  the  mechanisms  were  introduced  to  secure  NS  and  NA 
messages which are being used by the IPv6 hosts to perform DAD process in IPv6 
network. Nevertheless, these proposed mechanisms have indirectly introduced 
spoofing vulnerabilities which can cause DoS attacks on DAD process. Since, there is 
no proper mechanism to address this problem. Therefore, preventing the spoofing of 
NS/NA messages which can induce DoS attacks on DAD process in IPv6 distributed 
network is the research problem addressed in this thesis.  
Based on the research problem as above mentioned there are some reasons that 
are responsible for this problem as follows:  
1. During DAD process IPv6 host(s) uses neighbor solicitation (NS) and neighbor 
advertisement (NA) messages, which are insecure by design. Therefore, any 
malicious  host  can  simply  modify  the  NA  message  upon  receiving  the  NS 
message.  
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2. Existing mechanisms such as: Trust-ND, Pull Model, and DAD-h, suffer from 
security  issues  such  as;  hash  collision,  brute  force  attacks  which  can  be 
exploited to cause NS/NA message spoofing thus, can induce DoS attack on 
DAD process in IPv6 distributed network.  
1.3 Research Goal and Hypothesis  
The  goal  of  this  research  work  is  to  secure  DAD  process  during  address  auto-
configuration, with reduced process overhead in IPv6 distributed network. Thus, IPv6 
hosts can perform secure DAD process and the failure caused by DoS attack can be 
eliminated in IPv6 distributed network. In order to achieve this goal, the hypothesis of 
this research has been presented as follow:  
An integrated framework for securing duplicate address detection 
process by preventing any exploitations of neighbor solicitation (NS) and 
neighbor advertisement (NA) messages which are responsible for 
inducing  denial  of  service  (DoS)  attack  during  message  verification 
process between hosts in IPv6 distributed network.  
1.4 Research Questions and Objectives  
Due to the reasons as aforementioned in Section 1.2, IPv6 DAD process is still 
prone to DoS attacks. As a result, three research questions rise to address this research 
problem as follows: 
1. What are the constraints of existing security mechanisms? 
2. What is a suitable mechanism to prevent spoofing during DAD process? 
3. What are the appropriate evaluation methods to evaluate the designed 
mechanism?  
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In order to achieve the research goal in answering the abovementioned research 
questions, the following objectives need to be fulfilled: 
1. To design an integrated framework to secure DAD process against DoS attacks 
in  IPv6  distributed  network  that  is  more  effective  in  terms  of  resources 
requirement. 
2. To redesign the NDP message structure to prevent spoofing attacks via replay 
and MITM attacks.  
3. To deploy an IPv6 test-bed to evaluate the performance of the redesigned NDP 
messages  in  terms  of  lightweight,  confidentiality,  integrity,  and  availability 
during DAD process in IPv6 distributed network.  
1.5 Research Contributions 
The role of DAD process in IPv6 address auto-configuration and its security issues has 
been briefly discussed.  In order to address its issue, security mechanisms have been   
proposed as aforementioned in Section 1.2. Nevertheless, these proposed mechanism 
due to their designed mechanism are vulnerable to spoofing attacks which can induce 
DoS attacks during DAD process in IPv6 distributed network as stated in Section 1.2. 
In order to resolve this issue, this research has redesigned NDP messages to secure 
link  local  communication  in  IPv6  distributed  network.  By  securing  the  neighbor 
solicitation (NS) and neighbor advertisement (NA) messages via Secure-tag Option 
from any exploitation which can cause DoS attacks on DAD process between the hosts 
in IPv6 distributed network.  
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Moreover, address resolution and neighbor unreachability detection 
functionalities also use NS and NA messages to perform their operations in IPv6 link 
local  network. Since, both of these operations are part of NDP process as stated in 
Section 1.1.5. Therefore, these Secured NS/NA messages are also applicable for these 
operations to secure address resolution and neighbor unreachability detection 
processes between the hosts in IPv6 distributed network. Therefore, the contributions 
of this research are as follows: 
1. Integrated framework for secure DAD process in IPv6 distributed network.  
2. Redesigned  NDP  messages  i.e.  NS/NA  messages  by  introducing  Secure-tag 
Option to perform secure DAD process.  
3. Other sub-contributions of this research are related to two NDP processes i.e. 
address resolution and neighbor unreachability detection operations. By securing 
these operations via Secured NS/NA messages.  
1.6 Research Scope   
In  this  study,  the  research  scope  of  the  designed  security  mechanism  is  limited  to 
secure DAD process during stateless address auto-configuration  in IPv6 distributed 
network as depicted in Table 1.1. By securing NS and NA message via Secure-tag 
Option to ensure a secure link local communication during DAD process between the 
hosts in IPv6 distributed network. This Integrated framework is designed for Stateless 
Address Auto-configuration (SLAAC) in IPv6 distributed network. Although, DAD 
process is also required in stateful address auto-configuration (DHCPv6) i.e. 
client/server model based, used to manage the network devices and address 
configuration centrally.  However,  that  is  out of  the  scope of  this  thesis.  Moreover, 
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NS/NA messages can also be exploited to cause flood attack by buffer overflow and 
neighbor  cache  poisoning.  Since,  this  research  is  not  focusing  on  flooding  attacks. 
Therefore, NS/NA flooding is not covered in this thesis. 
Table 1.1: Research Scope 
Items Scope of Research 
Environment IPv6 Network 
Attack Type  DoS-on-DAD Attack 
NDP Message Types Neighbor Solicitation (NS)  
& Neighbor Advertisement (NA) 
DoS Target Network layer 
Address Auto-configuration  Stateless Address Auto-configuration 
(SLAAC) 
 
 
1.7 Research Steps 
In order to achieve the objectives of this research, numerous research phases have been 
followed that includes: (i) Literature review, to analyze the existing studies and define 
the research problem, (ii) Design of an integrated framework to secure DAD process 
in IPv6 distributed network, (iii) Prerequisites and test-bed setup for the experimental 
purposes,  (iv)  Implementation  of  the  redesigned  NDP  messages  to  secure  DAD 
process  for  IPv6  distributed  network,  and  (v)  Evaluation  of  the  redesigned  NDP 
messages for IPv6 DAD process. Figure 1.4 explains the main phases of this research 
study. 
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Figure 1.4:  Main Phases of  Research Study. 
 
In the first phase, the research problem is defined and comprehensively analyzed 
through  a  critical  review  of  existing mechanisms.  Hence,  this literature  review 
provides an understanding of the problem, existing solution space, and future research 
scope.  
In  the  second  phase,  the  solution  for  the  research  problem  is  presented.  The 
solution consists of several stages to secure DAD process in IPv6 distributed network. 
The  designed  integrated  framework  employs  software  defined  network  concept  to 
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secure IPv6 hosts DAD process via Secure-tag Option from disrupting during address 
verification process in IPv6 distributed network.  
 In  the  third  phase,  prerequisites  for  the  experimental  deign  such  as;  Java 
platform, experimental tools etc. are selected to setup IPv6 test-bed environment to 
carry out the research experiments.  
 The fourth phase is mainly concerned with implementation of the redesigned 
NDP messages i.e. Secured NS/NA messages to secure DAD process during address 
auto-configuration in IPv6 distributed network.  
In the final phase, the evaluation stage leads to the attainment of the goal of this 
research.  For  that  purpose,  the  redesigned  NDP messages i.e.  Secured  NS/NA 
messages are evaluated to  ensure a secure DAD  process  during  address auto-
configuration, with reduced process overhead in IPv6 distributed network.  
1.8 Thesis Organization  
This thesis is organized into six chapters, with this chapter being an introduction to 
this entire thesis. This is followed by other five chapters.  
Chapter  Two  describes  the  concepts  of  stateless  address  auto-configuration 
mechanism  and  duplicate  address  detection  process  in  IPv6  distributed  network. 
Moreover, it provides the literature review of the related works on existing security 
mechanism  for  DAD  process  in  IPv6  distributed  network.  Issues  with  the  existing 
security mechanisms are also discussed. Finally, this chapter provides the need of a 
new security mechanism for securing IPv6 DAD process against DoS attacks during 
address verification process in IPv6 distributed network. 
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 Chapter  Three  discusses  the  proposed  methodology  by  elaborating  how  an 
integrated framework was designed. Moreover, the algorithm and how it handles DoS 
threats on DAD process during address auto-configuration in IPv6 distributed network. 
 Chapter  Four  illustrates  the  implementation  details  of  the  redesigned  NDP 
messages i.e. Secured NS/NA messages to protect DAD process during address auto-
configuration in IPv6 distributed network.  
Chapter  Five  discusses  the  evaluation  of  the  redesigned  NDP  messages  i.e. 
Secured NS/NA messages and analysis of the results obtained through 
experimentations.  This  chapter  also  discusses  the  performance  evaluation  of  the 
Secure-DAD compared with existing mechanisms.  
Chapter Six presents the conclusion of this thesis and the possible future research 
work.   
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CHAPTER TWO 
 LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
2.1 Introduction 
The importance of securing IPv6 Duplicate Address Detection process was generally 
described  in  Chapter  One.  This  chapter  provides  the  background  and  some  related 
research on securing DAD process that defines the general structure of this research. 
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows: At first, a general concept about IPv6 
link  local  communication  is  presented.  IPv6  address  auto-configuration  mechanism 
and  related  information  is  described  in  details  in  Section  2.2  and  its  subsections 
respectively. Then, this chapter explains the DAD process, its related security issue, 
its impact and significance of securing DAD process in IPv6 link local network are 
mentioned in Section 2.3 and its respective subsections. 
 The  related  works  on  securing  duplicate  address  detection  mechanism  are 
provided in Section 2.4 and its respective subsections. In Section 2.5 some alternative 
security mechanisms are mentioned. The summary of the related works is presented in 
Section 2.6. This is followed by the description on the need of new security mechanism 
for DAD process in Section 2.7 and its subsections respectively. Section 2.8 presents 
the concept of Software-Defined Networking and its relevance to the design of a new 
security mechanism for DAD process. At last, the summary of this chapter is provided. 
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2.1.1 IPv6 Link Local Communication 
 In IPv6 link local network, IPv6 host can communicate with other neighboring hosts 
directly using wired as well as wireless medium. For this purpose, IPv6 hosts use new 
communication protocol known as Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP) (Narten et al., 
2007)  in  IPv6  link  local  network  instead  of  Address  Resolution  Protocol  (ARP) 
(Plummer, 1982) used by IPv4 protocol as aforementioned in Chapter One. 
Neighbor discovery, as the name suggests in IPv6 networks allow the hosts to 
find  the presence and  link  local addresses  of other  hosts on  the  same  link.  Also,  it 
provides  other  functionalities  such  as;  address  resolution,  neighbor  unreachability 
detection, router discovery, redirect method for routers to inform hosts about the most 
appropriate router available on the same link. Besides, it resolves duplicate address 
detection on the same link which has been discussed in details in Section 2.3. 
2.2 IPv6 Address Auto-Configuration  
IPv6 address auto-configuration are of two types such as; stateful address auto-
configuration (DHCPv6) and stateless address auto-configuration (SLAAC). In case 
of stateful address auto-configuration, IPv6 hosts obtain address configuration 
paramenters and other network services from the DHCPv6 server. This type of address 
configuration is based on client-server model where IPv6 hosts as a client requests the 
DHCPv6 server to pass the address configuration parameters in order to be able to 
obtain the unique IP address as specified in RFC 3315 (Droms, 2003).  
On the other hand, Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) mechanism 
as  defined  in  RFC  4862  (Thomson  et  al.,  2007),  enables  IPv6  hosts  to  obtain  IP 
addresses automatically without the need for DHCPv6 server. SLAAC mechanism can 
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ease addressing  assignments  compared  to  the   Stateful  Address  Auto-configuration 
(DHCP server), while configuring hosts as it does not require any intervention, thus 
provides flexibility in address configuration.  
Stateful address auto-configuration (DHCPv6) is  suitable for the centralized  
network where a central server is being deployed to provide address configuration and 
other  network  services  to  the  hosts.  Whereas,  Stateless  Address  Autoconfiguration 
(SLAAC) is meant for decentralized network consisting of a collection of autonomous 
hosts that communicate with each other by exchanging messages (Li & Singal 2007). 
For  instance,  public  area  networks  where  the  address  configuration  and  network 
services  are  shared  in  a  distributed  manner.  Since,  this  thesis  is  only  focusing  at 
securing DAD process during Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) for IPv6 
distributed  network.  Therefore,  Stateful  address  auto-configuration  (DHCPv6)  as 
mentioned in Chapter One is beyond the scope of this thesis, hence cannot be discussed 
further.   
2.2.1 IPv6 Address Auto-configuration Process  
When a  new host joins an IPv6 network it goes through a number of operations to 
configure its own interface identifier (Cooper et al., 2016). For instance, once a host 
connects to an IPv6 network, it sends a Router Solicitation (RS) message to the access 
router to get the network prefix information. In response, access router replies with a 
Router Advertisement (RA) message to provide the requested information. As the host 
gathers  required parameters  which  allows  it to  generate  its  own  interface  identifier 
(IID) (Hinden and Deering, 2006).  
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IPv6 host creates the rightmost 64 bits Interface Identifier (IID), which identifies 
an  individual  host  within  a  local  network.  The  IID  is  often  configured  from  the 
Extended Unique Identifier (EUI-64) that is generated based on the interface hardware 
identifier usually the MAC address of the network card (Cooper et al., 2016; AlSa’deh 
et al., 2013; Narten et al., 2007).  
Afterwards, the host combines the subnet prefix with the IID to form a complete 
128  bits  IPv6  address  which  is  required  for  the  IPv6  hosts  to  communicate  in  a 
network. In order to be able to communicate on the same network, IPv6 host(s) has to 
verify the uniqueness of its self-generated IP address which is the final stage of address 
auto-configuration (Yao et al., 2010; Moore et al., 2006), which is being performed by 
Duplicate Address Detection process as aforementioned in Chapter One and has been 
further explained in detail in Section 2.3.  
In IPv6 link local communication, IPv6 hosts use ICMPv6 messages also known 
as  Neighbor  Discovery  Protocol  messages  to  perform  address  auto-configuration 
process (Rosen, 2014; Conta and Gupta, 2006) as stated in Chapter One in Section 
1.1.5.  Figure  2.1  depicts  the  new  host  address  auto-configuration  process  in  IPv6 
network. 
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Figure 2.1: IPv6 Address Auto-configuration Process. 
 
2.2.2 The Need of ICMPv6 Messages  
ICMP  is  a  main  part of  Internet  protocol  suite,  as  defined  in  (Postel, 1981).  ICMP 
messages are generally used for diagnostic, testing, control purposes or generated in 
response to errors, and report problem conditions in IP operations which are directed 
to the source IP address of the originating packet (Rosen 2014). For example, IPv4 
uses  ICMPv4  messages  for  that  purposes.  Similarly,  IPv6  protocol  uses  ICMPv6 
messages for doing the same operations.  
The  differences  between  the  two  ICMP  message  protocols,  i.e.  ICMPv4  and 
ICMPv6, are in specific message types and formats. For instance, in ICMPv4 there is 
no  relationship  between  Type  value  and  message  type.  However,  in  ICMPv6  error 
messages  have  a  Type  value  of  0  to  127,  informational  messages  128  to  255  and 
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ICMPv6 messages are transported by IPv6 packets in which the IPv6 Next  Header 
value for ICMPv6 is set to 58 (Li et al., 2011; Convery and Miller, 2004). Appendix 
A lists the ICMPv6 message types and their functionalities. 
However, studies ( Saad, et al. 2013; Ali 2012; Batiha et al., 2011; Durdaugi and 
Buldu, 2010) have shown that  ICMPv4 messages are vulnerable to security threats 
some of the well-known threats are: Ping of Death, Smurf attack, ICMP redirect attack, 
and DoS attacks. In order to counter these security threats, prevention measures can 
be employed by deploying the IDS’s and firewalls at the edge or gateway routers to 
detect and drop or block such malicious ICMP messages. Similarly, ICMPv6 messages 
can suffer from the same issues. Nevertheless, ICMPv6 messages cannot be simply 
blocked or dropped due to the fact that Neighbor Discovery Protocol (NDP), address 
auto-configuration  and  other  IPv6  services  requires  ICMPv6  messages  to  perform 
these  operations  (Elejla  t  al.,  2016;  Saad  et  al.  2013;  AlSa'deh  and  Meinel,  2012; 
Caicedo et al. 2009; Nikander et al. 2004). 
2.2.3 IPv6 Address Auto-configuration States 
Auto-configured address can be in one or more of the following states during its valid-
life timer i.e. Tentative, Valid, Preferred, Deprecated or Invalid (Thomson et al., 2007). 
These states can be described as follows:   
1. Tentative state: Auto-configured address is considered tentative when it is in 
the  process  of  being  verified  as  unique.  Verification  of  an  address  occurs 
during duplicate address detection process. A host(s) having tentative address 
cannot  receive  unicast  traffic.  However,  can  receive  and  process  multicast 
